Report on the FBI's Investigation of the March 30, 1997, Bombing in Cambodia.

Requested in the 1998 Foreign Appropriations Act (Public Law 105-118); delivered

to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 24, 1998

AT approximately 8:30 am on March 30, 1997, unidentified assailants detonated four

grenades during a Khmer National Party (KNP) political protest demonstration led

by Sam Rainsy, the KNP party leader. (The KNP is one of three competing political

parties in Cambodia, along with Hun Sen's Cambodian People's Party (CPP) and Prince

Norodom Ranariddh's FUNCINPEC party.) The demonstration was held in a park opposite

the National Assembly in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, and attended by many of the party's

supporters. Initial investigation indicated that two unknown subjects escaped on

foot after throwing two grenades from behind the KNP supporters. Conflicting reports

were also received that individual(s) either on a motorcycle and/or in a white sedan

had dropped two additional grenades. A unit of heavily-armed troops in full combat

assault uniforms was positioned near the KNP speech platform. According to local

media reports, these soldiers made no attempt to apprehend the attackers and prevented

KNP supporters from doing so.

The dead after the grenade attack on the Sam Rainsy rally on March 30, 1997

Rainsy publicly blamed Second Prime Minister Hun Sen for the attack while Hun Sen's

party - the CPP - publicly blamed the Khmer Rouge. Hun Sen later blamed Rainsy

for staging the attack against himself.

Cambodian Police reports indicate between 16 and 20 people attending the demonstration

were killed and 150 wounded, many seriously. Sam Rainsy, the apparent target of the

attack, escaped without injury. Among those killed were two 13-year-old children,

a 17-year-old student, Rainsy's bodyguard, a journalist and several female garment

workers. A Chinese journalist, who suffered serious abdominal wounds, was among the

injured.

During the attack, Ron Abney, an American citizen and Chief of the Delegation of

the International Republican Institute (IRI), sustained shrapnel wounds in the leg

and was evacuated to Mt Elizabeth Hospital in Singapore for medical treatment. He

was subsequently released to the care of his personal physician in Cochran, Georgia,

on April 8, 1997.

CPP public statements indicated that there was an [un]usually light police presence,

approximately 20 officers, considerably less than present at previous KNP rallies.

None of these officers were injured. None of the previous rallies had a military

presence, which for the March 30, 1997, rally was confirmed to be a detachment of

Hun Sen's bodyguards.

On March 31, 1997, FBIHQ apprised the Terrorism and Violent Crime Section

(TVCS), Criminal Division, Department of Justice, (DOJ), of the information available

surrounding the incident and the injury of Mr Abney and an opinion was rendered that,

pursuant to Title 18, US Code, Section 2332, which states "it is a federal crime

for a terrorist overseas to kill a US national, attempt to murder a US national,

conspire to murder a US national, or to engage in physical violence a) with the intent

to cause serious bodily injury to a US national or b) with the result that serious

bodily injury is caused to a US national," the FBI has jurisdiction to initiate

an investigation into this matter.

On April 1, 1997, First Deputy Director of the National Police Chhay Bornlay

requested FBI assistance, especially sketch artist assistance, on behalf of FUNCINPEC.

FBIHQ discussed this Foreign Police Co-operation request for FBI assistance with

the Department of State Office for Counterterrorism and decided that any request

for FBI assistance should come from the entire Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC)

and not just one of the coalition partners.

On April 4, 1997, the FBI Investigative Case Agent (ICA) interviewed Ron Abney

in Mt Elizabeth Hospital regarding the grenade attack. The interview was conducted

with the US Embassy Regional Security Officer (RSO). Abney advised that while he

did not believe he was the intended target of the attack he would have been an ideal

target of opportunity.

On April 9, 1997, The RGC formally requested the assistance of an FBI sketch

artist to draw composites provided by eyewitnesses. Also on that day, FBIHQ provided

the TVCS a copy of the interview with Ron Abney. Upon review of the interview, the

TVCS opined that, pursuant to Title 18, US Code, Section 2332a (Use of Weapons of

Mass Destruction), the FBI had jurisdiction to investigate the March 30, 1997, attack.

Based on the FBI's investigative jurisdiction and invitation by the RGC, the FBI

sent an agent to Cambodia in furtherance of this investigation. The agent was advised

by FBIHQ to work closely with the USDS Regional Security Officer (RSO) in Cambodia.

The Cambodian desk officer at the State Department and the US Ambassador to Cambodia

were both apprised by the FBI of the FBI's investigative responsibility in this matter.

The ICA initially traveled to Cambodia on April 17, 1997, to meet with the US Ambassador

and Embassy officials. The Embassy officials informed the FBI of the Cambodian officials'

willingness to assist the FBI in its investigation.

On April 24, 1997, The FBI legal Attaché (Legat) in Bangkok, an FBI

sketch artist and the ICA were briefed by Ambassador Kenneth M Quinn. Also, approval

was obtained for a second FBI agent to travel to Cambodia to assist in the investigation.

The second FBI agent arrived in Cambodia on April 29, 1997.

On April 26, 1997, FBI representatives met with Ambassador Quinn; the RSO;

Co-Deputy Prime Minister/Co-Minister of the Interior Sar Kheng (Kheng serves in both

capacities for the Cambodian People's Party or CPP); Co-Minister of the Interior

You Hockry (FUNCINPEC); General Chhay Bornlay (FUNCINPEC), advisor to You Hockry,

and Deputy Director General of the National Police Teng Savon. Translation was provided

by General Keo Sopheak, advisor to Sar Kheng. This meeting was primarily an introduction

of personnel and an expression of gratitude regarding the FBI's prompt response to

the Cambodian's request for investigative assistance. The FBI requested that publicity

regarding the FBI be kept to a minimum and informed those present at the meeting

that the FBI's instructions were to investigate the injury of a US citizen during

a terrorist attack. During this meeting, the FBI was advised that General Teng Savon

would command the investigation and the primary FBI contacts would be Keo Sopheak

representing the CPP and Chhay Bornlay representing FUNCINPEC.

The FBI proceeded with its investigation in Phnom Penh, in concert with the Cambodian

Commission consisting of representatives from both the CPP and FUNCINPEC. During

this investigation, every effort was made by the FBI to conduct a criminal investigation

in accordance with the FBI's extra-territorial responsibilities and avoid involvement

in Cambodia's internal politics. After a week of joint Commission investigative inactivity,

numerous leads and eyewitnesses were developed by the FBI ICA. With the concurrence

of the US Ambassador and Police Major General Savon, the ICA conducted extensive

debriefings of eyewitnesses who offered information to the FBI but refused to cooperate

with the Cambodian Police or the Investigation Commission.

In addition to eyewitness testimony, photographic evidence was obtained from an additional

witness. After reviewing the photographs related to the incident, and presenting

a photospread to witnesses, it was determined that one of the photos contained a

subject who appears to be one of the grenade throwers. Efforts were made to fully

identify this individual.

After the first week of the investigation, the FBI team briefed the Ambassador of

what they felt was insufficient cooperation by the police, including the inability

to question members of the military unit guarding the compound of the Second Prime

Minister. The Ambassador offered to assist and it was jointly agreed that they would

meet with Interior Minister Sar Kheng in an effort to enhance cooperation. On May

2, 1997, the ICA and Ambassador Quinn met with Co-Deputy Prime Minister (CPP) Sar

Kheng.

Based on information obtained from witnesses, including Sam Rainsy, it was learned

that a long-standing feud exists between former FUNCINPEC Secretary of the Treasury

and KNP President, Sam Rainsy, and CPP Second Prime Minister, Hun Sen. Sam Rainsy

claimed to have been surveilled on several occasions prior to the March 30, 1997,

grenade attack. On March 26, 1997, the KNP requested a legal permit, issued by the

Ministry of Interior, to demonstrate. The KNP obtained permission to demonstrate

on March 29, 1997. Security was the responsibility of the Phnom Penh Municipal Police

Force (PPMPF) and its Commander, Mok Chito, Hun Sen's nephew.

The PPMPF was not represented on the Investigation Commission and its Commander was

not made available for interview.

According to Sam Rainsy and retired Secretary of State Kong Korm, 14 previous KNP

demonstrations suffered only mild police harassment. Although a small number of police

were initially present prior to the rally, police presence was unobserved as the

rally began on March 30, 1997. After what appeared to be a prearranged signal ordering

a retreat of police officers, four squads of Hun Sen's "Bodyguard Force"

(2nd Battalion, 17th Regiment) were deployed, in a linear position along Street 7

on the park's West boundary. A military unit has never been deployed at a civilian

political rally in the past according to Sam Rainsy.

On May 9, 1997, the ICA and six police officials interviewed Brigadier General

Huy Pised [sic], Major Chhin Savon and another soldier at the Ministry of Interior

Police General Staff Headquarters. General Pised is the commanding general of Bodyguard

Unit #2 of the 17th Division assigned to protect Second Prime Minister Hun Sen. Major

Chhin Savon was the on-scene commander of 15 soldiers from Bodyguard Unit #2 at the

March 30, 1997, rally. During the interview, General Pised and Major Savon denied

that anyone escaped through the perimeter. Furthermore, they stated "We saw

nothing."

On May 11, 1997, the ICA and Legat Bangkok interviewed Sam Rainsy in Bangkok,

Thailand. After FBI representatives informed Rainsy that public disclosure of this

meeting would jeopardize the FBI's investigation, Rainsy consented not to reveal

the convocation of the interview. In his account of the events on March 30, 1997,

Rainsy noted the unusual presence of military forces and a lack of regular police

forces. This arrangement was counter to the RGC deployment during his 14 previous

demonstrations in Phnom Penh. On May 14, 1997, the FBI reinterviewed Rainsy in Cambodia

in conjunction with the RGC investigators. No additional investigative information

was gathered as a result of this interview.

On the evening of May 14, 1997, the FBI representative briefed Ambassador

Quinn on the status and findings of the investigation. Investigation to date failed

to develop evidence that the United States was the primary target of the March 30,

1997, attack. The FBI suggested the following recommendations be provided to the

RGC investigative commission:

1. That the FBI's sketch artist and one FBI agent return to the United States.

2. That the local media be advised that the US inquiry regarding Abney is completed

   but that it is classified "Secret" and only releasable by the US Department

   of Justice in conjunction with the US Department of State.

3. That an FBI agent remain in Cambodia to assist the RGC investigation in an overt

   advisory capacity to the Commanding General of the Police investigative commission.

4. That the FBI provide the Commanding General written investigative leads which

   need to be completed to resolve the investigation.

5. That the investigative commission regularly submit their investigative reports

   to the FBI representative.

6. That the Co-Deputy Prime Ministers submit a formal letter requesting the above-outlined

   FBI investigative assistance.

7. That no statement be made to the Cambodian media regarding the FBI representative.

8. That if the Cambodian Police fail to initiate or accomplish the FBI's recommended

   investigatory steps within "a reasonable period of time," then the police

   should provide a statement as to cause.

9. That the status of the investigation be re-addressed with the investigative commission

   within 14 working days. If no significant progress was made by that time, then the

   presence of the FBI representative would be terminated after 30 working days.

10. That the commission immediately use the composite sketches provided by the FBI

    by publishing them and presenting them to all potential subjects and witnesses.

Ambassador Quinn approved the 10 recommendations. In addition, Co-Minister of

the Interior Sar Kheng and Sam Rainsy both concurred with the FBI's role as outlined

in the third recommendation.

On May 16, 1997, in accordance with the first recommendations, the FBI's sketch

artist and one FBI agent returned to the United States.

On May 17, 1997, Sar Kheng met with Ambassador Quinn and conveyed the sentiment

that the composite sketches should be held back from publication because the investigation

into the identity of the persons depicted was on-going.

On May 22, 1997, Rainsy asked the ICA for a copy of the investigative report.

Rainsy was informed that the ICA could not accede to Rainsy's request. Rainsy expressed

unhappiness and some anger at the fact that he would not be given a copy of any FBI

reports on this investigation. Rainsy became even more agitated when the ICA informed

Rainsy that there were genuine questions about the allegations and motives of the

grenade throwers. Rainsy then suggested that the FBI agent should be careful because

he might become a target for violence. Rainsy also predicted that another violent

incident might occur in the near future.

On May 27, 1997, Sam Rainsy conducted a press conference in which he linked

the FBI's investigation to a "Preliminary Report" which Rainsy claimed

pointed to Second Prime Minister Hun Sen as the culprit of the March 30, 1997, attack.

Rainsy also claimed to have a RGC "confidential report", given to him by

First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh, substantiating Rainsy's claim of Hun Sen's

culpability.

During the FBI's presence in Cambodia, 56 interviews were conducted by the FBI. Twenty-nine

interviews were with the joint FBI-Cambodian coalition, six interviews with only

the FUNCINPEC police present, and 21 interviews were conducted privately with US

Embassy personnel present. All the interviews were conducted with the Ambassador's

knowledge. Some of the witnesses interviewed spoke English. For those interviews

which required a translator, translations were provided by either FUNCINPEC General

Bornlay, CPP General Keo Sopheak, or one of two US Embassy personnel. Seven of the

private interviews of witnesses were translated by Rainsy. The two Embassy translators

provided translations for 24 of the interviews that were conducted with the Cambodian

officials. The FBI's sketch artist produced nine sketches while in the company of

the investigative commission. Three of the sketches (one of each suspect), were provided

to the Cambodians. On May 29, 1997, the sketches were published in the Cambodian

media.

On June 19, 1997, Legat Bangkok met with Ambassador Quinn, Co-Ministers of

the Interior Sar Kheng and You Hockry and Ok Serei Sopheak, advisor and Director

of Cabinet to Sar Kheng. Legat Bangkok advised that the FBI was interested in obtaining

any reports or results of the investigation generated by the investigative commission

and any information about a suspected grenade-thrower identified as "Brazil."

Cambodian press reports identified "Brazil" as a participant in the March

30, 1997, attack who was apprehended by Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) Deputy

Chief of Staff Lt General Nhek [sic] Bun Chhay (FUNCINPEC) on June 1, 1997, and held

in General Bun Chhay's custody. "Brazil" is believed to be identical to

FBI subject #2. Sar Kheng and You Hockry denied having any specific information on

"Brazil." In follow-up meetings on June 23 and June 24, 1997, Sar Kheng

would not approve a request for a joint FBI-RGC interview of "Brazil."

On June 20, 1997, Legat Bangkok met with Sar Kheng, You Hockry and the investigative

commission. Legat Bangkok received two investigative reports on the March 30, 1997,

attack, in Khmer, prepared by the commission. Legat Bangkok forwarded these reports

to FBIHQ for translation. Both Ministers stressed that all information generated

from the investigation should be kept from the Cambodian press. Minister Hockry noted

that the commission had received some information by telephone about the March 30,

1997, attack since the publication of the composite sketches. Minister Hockry advised

that he would write a report based upon his notes from the phone calls to the commission

and to himself and provide the report to the FBI. Hockry mentioned that "Brazil"

had not been arrested by General Bun Chhay and that, contrary to press reports, "Brazil"

had made no admissions of involvement in the March 30, 1997, attack.

Between July 4 and July 6, a coup led by CPP Prime Minister Hun Sen's military

forces overthrew the reigning government in Cambodia. Fighting continued for the

following weeks as Hun Sen's forces fought FUNCINPEC's forces. Several US citizens

were held up in hotels and residences throughout Phnom Penh, although no Americans

appear to have been the intended target of any violence.

Unconfirmed reports from Cambodia indicate that "Brazil" escaped during

the early July 1997 coup. His present whereabouts are unknown to the FBI.

On July 14, 1997, the ICA received from Legat Bangkok a 4 x 6 obtained from

Phnom Penh RSO that was purported to be "Brazil." The ICA's review of the

photo and comparison with a previously obtained photo on FBI subject #2, whom six

witnesses identified as one of the grenade-throwers, revealed that the individuals

in the two photos demonstrated no similarities of physical resemblance.

On June 4, 1998, Legat Bangkok met in the US Embassy Bangkok with Saumara

Rainsy [sic ] (wife of Sam Rainsy) and two witnesses who claimed to have information

on the March 30, 1997 attack - Chhay Vee and Chom Bon Theun (aka Chum Bun Thoeun).

According to Chom Bon Theun, CPP party leader Heng Bon Hiang approached Chom Bon

Theun in mid-March 1997 and asked Chom Bon Theun to assist in a plot to launch a

grenade attack on the March 30 rally/demonstration. Chom Bon Theun advised Legat

Bangkok that he (Theun) helped Hiang recruit the suspect "Brazil" and personally

recruited Chhay Vee. Chom Bon Theun also noted that six or seven months after the

March 30 attack, he saw Brazil's corpse near a military base in Tang Kasang.

During the June 4, 1998 interviews Saumara claimed that Chhay Vee had admitted

to throwing one of the grenades at the rally. Chhay Vee admitted to being recruited

by Chom Bon Theun to throw grenades at the March 30 demonstration in return for payment.

Chhay Vee also stated in the interview that Chom Bon Theun knew Sam Rainsy personally.

Both Chhay Vee and Chom Bon Theun informed Legat Bangkok that they voluntarily decided

to confess their involvement to Sam Rainsy, possibly in return for money.

On November 13, 1998, Legat Bangkok and RSO Phil Whitney, with the assistance

of Khmer language translator Yarong Van, reinterviewed Chhay Vee and Chom Bon Theun.

Both subjects advised that their previous statements were false and that neither

had anything to do with the March 30 attack. Chom Bon Theun stated that Sam Rainsy

Party official Eng Chhay Eang provided him and Chhay Vee with the story of their

guilt. Eang wrote a script for Chom Bon Theun to memorize which was roughly the same

story Theun provided to Legat Bangkok on June 4. Chom Bon Theun advised that Eang

offered to him and Chhay Vee $15,000 each in return for telling the false story about

their participation in the attack to the UNCHR, FBI and others.

All investigative findings are complete. The FBI has presented its investigative

findings to the Department of Justice for a prosecutive opinion.