BEIJING/PHILADELPHIA – Ahead of a highly anticipated summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in mid-May, Beijing appears to be shaping the agenda early by calling Taiwan the “biggest risk” in bilateral ties and signalling how Washington handles the issue will be key to whether relations can continue to stabilise.
All eyes are on what Beijing realistically expects Washington to deliver, how far Mr Trump is willing or able to go, and what deal they are willing to strike.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi had said in a call with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on April 30 that the Taiwan issue concerns China’s “core interests” and represents the “biggest risk” in China-US relations.
Mr Wang said both sides should “maintain the hard-won stability” in ties and make good preparations for the “important agenda for high-level interactions”, according to the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s read-out of the call.
There was no official US statement on the call, though Mr Rubio later said Taiwan will be a topic of conversation during Mr Trump’s visit to Beijing slated for May 14 and 15, and “we don’t need any destabilising events to occur with regards to Taiwan”.
By framing Taiwan as the “biggest risk” in relations, analysts said, Beijing is seeking to raise the issue’s negotiating weight and ensure it is not sidelined in what could otherwise become a deal-driven summit focused on trade, technology or global crises.
Progress, or at least restraint, from Washington regarding Taiwan may now be seen as key to any broader reset in ties, they added.
“That Taiwan is the ‘biggest risk’ is deliberate escalatory language designed to test Washington’s threshold,” Mr Han Shen Lin, China managing director for The Asia Group consultancy, told The Straits Times.
Beijing is making a calibrated move by foregrounding Taiwan ahead of the summit to ensure the issue is treated as a deliverable, rather than a longstanding grievance to be managed on the sidelines, said Mr Lin, who is based in Shanghai.
It marks a notable shift from the two leaders’ previous meeting in South Korea in October 2025, when Taiwan was not mentioned in the Chinese read-out.
While ties between the two countries have stabilised somewhat since the two leaders agreed to a truce in October 2025 to ease trade tensions, the relationship remains fragile as thorny issues such as export controls, advanced technology, rare earths and broader strategic competition remain unresolved.
During the call with Mr Rubio, Mr Wang also urged the United States to “honour its commitments… to open up new space for China-US cooperation”. The formulation of the phrase is “reasonably constructive” and a sign that Beijing prefers a transactional frame over confrontation, said Mr Lin.
“In other words, compliance on Taiwan is presented as unlocking broader bilateral progress. It’s less red line and a more conditional offer,” he added.
China sees the self-governing Taiwan as part of its territory and has vowed to unify with the island, by force if necessary. In recent years, China’s air force and navy have stepped up their presence near the island.
Beijing also prohibits all its diplomatic partners from maintaining formal ties with Taipei.
While the US has no formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, it is the island’s strongest backer and is bound by law to provide Taiwan with the means to defend itself.
In December 2025, Washington announced US$11.1 billion (S$14 billion) worth of arms sales to Taiwan, the largest ever weapons package, which drew Beijing’s ire.
Mr Trump previously in February 2026 suggested that he would discuss arms sales to Taiwan with Mr Xi, a statement that raised concerns on the island. He has also imposed new tariffs on imports from Taiwan and demanded it spend more on its own defence.
Mr Claus Soong, an analyst in the foreign relations team at German think-tank Mercator Institute for China Studies, told ST that Beijing had become more sophisticated in its Taiwan messaging, adopting a softer tone towards Taiwanese audiences while shifting rhetorical emphasis from promoting reunification to opposing independence.
That shift was reflected in Beijing’s warm reception for Taiwanese opposition leader Cheng Li-wun in early April.
Mr Soong said the handling of the visit was “not spontaneous but a carefully calculated move”, with Beijing trying to put up a “firewall” around the Taiwan issue, reinforcing that it should not be treated as a bargaining chip.
“Beijing showed that it can still engage with Taiwan directly without the need for Washington as a mediator,” he added.
What is Beijing seeking?
As Beijing becomes more active in setting the agenda when it comes to Taiwan, restraint from Washington could be viewed as a success, said Mr Soong.
“Even American silence on Taiwan could be a win for Beijing,” he added.
The Asia Group’s Mr Lin said Beijing’s minimum ask is procedural respect – no new arms approvals announced around the visit, no Taiwan-affirming language in any joint statement and ideally a reaffirmation of the “One China” policy.
“A freeze on pending arms sales or upgraded symbolic gestures, even a choreographed delay, would register as meaningful in Beijing’s calculus,” he said.
“Convincing Mr Trump to declare he ‘opposes Taiwan independence’ would be a home run,” he added.
During a discussion at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, Mr Neysun Mahboubi, director of the Penn Project on the Future of US-China Relations at the University of Pennsylvania, tossed up three possible scenarios.
First, Mr Xi could ask Mr Trump to agree that the US does not support Taiwanese independence, or that the US opposes Taiwanese independence. And, third, he could even ask the US to affirmatively support the unification of Taiwan with the mainland.
“It’s certainly a possibility that the (US) President is talked into one of those,” said Mr Matt Turpin, former director for China at the National Security Council during Mr Trump’s first term.
“The first or the second are more likely. I would be surprised about the third one, but I don’t count that out completely,” added Mr Turpin, now a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution.
“I suspect that the President understands the dynamics and how much this is what Xi Jinping wants.
“It’s not a small ask from Xi. Trump knows that and, therefore, would expect an awful lot in return. So is Xi Jinping willing to do something that Donald Trump really wants? That’s going to be the dynamic. And it’s very much his (Trump’s) style to keep everyone guessing until the final minute.”
Mr Trump’s National Security Strategy, unveiled in December 2025, had stated the US would maintain its longstanding declaratory policy on Taiwan: that the US does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.
However, there was no mention of the other part of the standard diplomatic wording – that the US “does not support Taiwan independence”.
The omission gave rise to talk that Mr Trump was leaving room for a future adjustment.
Certainly, Mr Trump has sent mixed signals – approving record arms sales to Taiwan, signing the Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act in December 2025 to ease official contacts and Pentagon tech collaborations.
Dr Zack Cooper, who studies US-China competition at the American Enterprise Institute, said he did not expect any dramatic developments.
“I think Trump is unlikely to make major concessions on Taiwan next week,” he told ST.
But he could make remarks about US policy towards Taiwan, arms sales in particular, which makes officials in Taipei deeply concerned.
“Many experts fear that Xi might offer Trump a large investment package in exchange for a continuous pause on arms sales to Taiwan,” Dr Cooper said.
“Even discussion of this possibility could damage confidence in the US among the Taiwanese population, and could prove detrimental to cross-strait stability,” he added.
Mr Trump remains the quintessential unpredictable actor, said Dr John Tai, professorial lecturer at the George Washington University, where he teaches courses on Taiwan.
“At this point, I think it’s anyone’s guess what Trump may or may not say about Taiwan,” Dr Tai said.
“I also think Trump has demonstrated that he doesn’t feel bound to whatever promises or concessions he might have given,” he told ST.
“Ultimately, Trump may offer just enough concessions to get a deal with Xi. But he reserves the right to walk back on that – or interpret that concession – whenever he believes it will serve his purpose.”
ANN/The Straits Times